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1. Introduction
An overt channel is a communication channel within a computer system or network, designed for the authorized
transfer of data. A covert channel (first introduced by Lampson [62]), on the other hand, is any communication
channel that can be exploited by a process to transfer information in a manner that violates the systems security
policy [26]. Any shared resource can potentially be used as a covert channel. Covert channels can be divided
primarily in storage and timing channels. In a case of the storage channels, usually one process writes (directly or
indirectly) to a shared resource, while another process reads from it. Timing channel is essentially any technique
that conveys information by the timing of events, in which case the receiving process needs a clock. Special
timing covert channel is counting channel which carries data by counting the occurrences of certain events [44].
Additionally, timing channels can be active if they generate additional traffic or passive if they manipulate
the timing of existing traffic. As any other communication channel, covert channel can be noisy or noiseless.
According to the number of information flows between the sender and the receiver - several or one, there are
aggregated and non-aggregated covert channels [36]. According to the presence or absence of the intermediate
node in the communication, covert channels can be indirect or direct. Payload tunnel is a covert channel, where
one protocol is tunnelled in the payload of the other protocol. Covert channels are studied as a part of the science
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steganography, and different steganographic methods used in telecommunication networks are known as network
steganography.
The adversary model is based on the Simmons prisoner problem [105]: two parties want to communicate confiden-
tially and undetected over an insecure channel, the warden. The warden can be passive - which monitor traffic and
report when some unauthorized traffic is detected, or active - which can modify the content of the messages with
the purpose of eliminating any form of hidden communication. Simmons introduced the term subliminal channel,
a variant of covert channel which uses cryptographic algorithm or protocol for hiding messages. A composition
of covert channel with subliminal channel is the hybrid channel.
Covert channels can be analysed by the total number of steganogram bits transmitted during a second (Raw Bit
Rate - RBR), or by the total number of steganogram bits transmitted per PDU (for example, Packet Raw Bit
Rate- PRBR) [78]. In ideal case, if no packets are lost, capacity of some storage channels can be expressed as
C = PRBR×N bps, where N is number of packets send in one second.
Network protocols are ideal for hiding data in them. Most of the network steganographic techniques for storage
channels utilizes the fact that there exist redundant fields in protocol headers, which can be used for hiding data
and creating covert channels. Wolf [124] proposed the reserved fields, pad field or undefined fields from the frames
of IEEE 802.2, 3, 4, and 5 networks to be used for this intention. Similar, Handel and Sandford [46] proposed the
reserved and unused fields from other protocol headers for same purpose. Another type are the fields filled with
“random” data, such as the IP Identification or TCP Initial Sequence Number (ISN) fields. But naively filling
them with data is detectable by passive warden [85], because these fields naturally exhibit sufficient structure and
non-uniformity to be efficiently and reliably differentiated from unmodified PDU.
The work of Rowland [98] is first proof of concept of the existence and the exploitation of covert channels in
TCP/IP protocol suite, by their concrete implementation. From the attacker’s point of view, network storage
channels are preferable than timing channels, because of the synchronization issues present in timing channels,
their complexity, noisiness, and their significantly lower bandwidth in comparison to storage channels. Network-
based covert channels can be used to coordinate distributed denial of service attacks, spreading of computer viruses
and worms, for secret communication between terrorists and criminals, but also for secure network management
communication [35], for bypassing the organization firewall, for transmitting authentication data [24] (like port
knocking), circumventing the limitation in using Internet in some countries (Infranet [33], Collage [16], FreeWave
[50]), for improving the security [76] of or providing QoS [75] for VoIP traffic, for watermarking of network
flows (RAINBOW [48], SWIRL [49]), for tracing encrypted attack traffic or tracking anonymous peer-to-peer
VoIP calls [121, 122], etc. Jones et al [54] propose a novel way to locate the entry point of an IP flow into
a given network domain based on a marking method using the IPv4 header TTL field as a covert channel to
carry the information. Recent P2P services are not immune to network steganography, so one can hide messages
in Skype communication (SkyDe, [74]) by replacing the encrypted silence with secret data bits (about 2 kbps
steganographic bandwidth), or in BitTorrent traffic (StegTorrent, [59]) by using the fact that, in BitTorrent there
are usually many-to-one transmissions, and that for its protocol µTP , the header provides means for packets’
numbering and retrieving their original sequence (about 270 bps steganographic bandwidth). FreeWave [50]
circumvents censorship by modulating Internet traffic into the acoustic signals carried over VoIP connections, and
they present one prototype using Skype. One can hide messages using the Google Suggest service as a carrier, by
StegSuggest [12], and up to 100 bits can be inserted per suggestions list sent by this service. Even Web counters
can be used to create covert storage channel (WebShare, [68]). New trends in network steganography are given
in [129].
One very good and comprehensive survey of network covert channels before 2007, classified according to used
techniques, is given in [126]. Other surveys are older, and present only several techniques [65, 108], or techniques
for TCP, IP and IPSec only [4]. Most of the covert channels have their implementation, and one survey of several
covert channel’s implementations are given in [107]. Our paper offers an up-to-date comprehensive survey of
the covert channels in TCP/IP protocol stack classified by affected layer and affected protocol, with included
advantages, disadvantages and defence mechanisms if exist.
Some techniques are protocol independent, like Perkins [93] covert channel using sum of all bits in a message.
At the beginning, sender and receiver need to agree about the maximum possible sum S and the number Ni of
intervals in [0, S]. If the bitwise summation belongs to the particular interval, this correspondents to transfer of
particular group of bits. This channel can send log2Ni bits per packet. Some network covert channels are inter-
protocol steganography solutions, which use the relation between two or more protocols from the TCP/IP stack
to enable secret communication. Jankowski et al [51] proposed PadSteg, which utilizes ARP and TCP protocols
together with an Etherleak vulnerability (improper Ethernet frame padding) to facilitate secret communication
for hidden groups in LANs. Dong et al [28] suggest packet classification, where one carrier (for example, IP
packet) is chosen, and several features (several fields from different protocols or timing features) are modulated,
so the message can be mapped first in the sorted vector, and then in the selected features.
2. Steganography in Internet layer
Internet Protocol (IP) is the primary protocol in the TCP/IP protocol stack, that operates in the Internet
layer. IP encapsulates obtained segments from Transport layer in packets with IP header, and delivers them
from a given source to a given destination using IP addresses. It enables internetworking, offering connectionless
datagram service. IP comes in two versions - version 4 (IPv4) and version 6 (IPv6). Table 1, 2 and 3 summarize the
covert channels in the Internet Protocol, together with their advantages, disadvantages and defence mechanisms.
Additionally, for storage channels their RBR or PRBR are given.
One group of of steganographic technics for IP uses fields from the IP header, that have some redundancy or
normally are not used during the transmissions, such as Identification, Flags, Fragment Offset and Options in
IPv4. Main drawback to all these channels is easy elimination by traffic normalizers, and main advantage is
big covert rate. Rowland [98] uses the 16-bits long Identification field from IPv4 header, in which he places the
character’ ASCII value multiplied by 256. If fragmentation occurs, the receiver will receive the same information
for every new fragment of the datagram. One can use the redundancy in the IP‘s fragmentation strategy [2, 3].
An unfragmented datagram has all zero fragmentation information (More Fragment (MF ) = 0, Do Not Fragment
(DF ) = 0, Fragment Offset=0). If communication parties know the MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) of their
network, they can use the DF bit for sending 1-bit data per packet, or combination of DF bit and Identification
field for sending 17-bit data per packet, by sending packets with sizes below the MTU. If communication parties
do not now the MTU, they can send 8-bit per packet, by filling high 8 bits of the Identification field (the low 8
bits are generated randomly) with result of xoring of the first fixed 8-bits of the IP header and 8-bit data. Only
condition is that the packet must not contain options in the IP header. Cauich et al [20] use the Identification
and Fragment Offset fields for hiding messages. Their method provide 29 bits in every datagram that is not
fragmented, but this can work only for two neighbouring nodes. First, they check if the receiving datagram has
fragmentation (MF = 1). In negative case, they use some of the three reserved bits in the header as indicator
does the datagram carries a message or not, and then they put the data in the datagram’s Identification and
Fragment Offset fields.
Some of the steganographic techniques, and presented in Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski paper[79], also deploy the
IP fragmentation process. The authors suggest:
 dividing the original IP packet into predefined number of fragments (for example, even number will be
binary 0, and odd number will be binary 1) - 1 bit per packet is send;
 modulating the values that are inserted into Fragment Offset field (for example, even value will be binary
1, and odd value will be binary 0) - NF − 1 bits per packet are send, where NF is the number of fragments
for that packet;
 using legitimate fragment with steganogram inserted into payload - NF ·FS bits per packet are send, where
NF is the number of fragments for that packet and the FS is the size of the fragment. It has big covert rate
and uses legitimate fragments, so it is harder to detect. Authors even suggested a method for the problem
of differentiating the covert fragments by applying hash function;
 using different rates for packet fragmentation (for example, one rate will be binary 1, and other will be
binary 0) - log2h bits per packet are send, where h is the number of packets generation rates.
Covert channels can be created using fields in protocol’s header that are changing during transmission, like 1-bit-
per-packet noisy covert channel using Time To Live (TTL) field, suggested by Qu et al [95]. Zander et al [125]
proposed an improved 1-bit-per-packet covert channel encoding in the TTL field, analysing initial TTL values
and normal TTL occurring in networks. They suggest using two different starting values of TTL in packets, the
typical initial value as High-TTL (binary 1) and High-TTL -1 as Low-TTL (binary 0).
Table 1. Covert storage channels for IPv4.
Paper Year Method PRBR Advantages Disadvantages Defence
Rowland [98] 1997 Identification field 16 Big covert rate Easy elimination
Traffic normalizer
and active warden
B0CK [120] 2000
Source address
+ IGMP 32 Easy deployment Easy elimination
Egress
filtering
Abad [1] 2001 Header checksum 16
Deployment in
IP, TCP, UDP
Need to know
original TTL
Ahsan et al [2] 2002 DF field 1 Easy elimination
Traffic normalizer
and active warden
Ahsan [3] 2002
DF and
Identification fields 17 Big covert rate Easy elimination
Traffic normalizer
and active warden
Ahsan [3] 2002
Version, IHL and
Identification fields 8 Big covert rate
Packet
without options
Traffic normalizer
and active warden
Cauich et al [20] 2002
Identification and
Fragment Offset fields 29 Big covert rate
Only between
neighbouring nodes
and not
fragmented packet
Traffic normalizer
and active warden
Qu et al [95] 2004 TTL 1 Hard detection
Without normal
initial TTL
Active warden
[125]
Zander et al [125] 2006 TTL 1
Normal
initial TTL Noisy channel
Active warden
[125]
Trabelsi et al
[114, 115] 2007 Record route options 320 Big covert rate
Mazurczyk et al
[79] 2009
Predefined number
of fragments 1 Big covert rate
Detectable
statistical
patterns
Statistical tests
based on
number of fragments,
or reassemble in
intermediate node
[79, 80]
Mazurczyk et al
[79] 2009
Modulating the
values in Fragment
Offset field NF − 1 Big covert rate
Detectable
statistical
patterns
Statistical tests
based on
fragments sizes,
or reassemble in
intermediate node
[79, 80]
Mazurczyk et al
[79] 2009
Steganogram in
fragment payload NF · Fs
Use of
legitimate
fragments
Differentiating
covert fragments
Reassemble in
intermediate node
[79, 80]
Mazurczyk et al
[79, 80] 2009
Probe messages
in PMTUD
up to
MTU Big covert rate
Need to
know MTU
Comparing
probe messages
[79, 80]
Servetto et al [103] introduces intentional losses in numbered stream of packets for creating a covert channel using
phantom packets. They skip one sequence number at the sender so no user data is lost. Loss that occurred during
fixed time interval is equal to sending one bit. The authors of [79, 80] use exactly the same technique for creating
phantom fragments, by skipping one Fragment Offset value. For this to work correctly a modified receiver is
needed.
Ahsan and Kundur [2, 3] showed how to create a covert timing channel using packet sorting. If one send n
packets and if the network guarantee proper sequencing for packet delivery, then by reordering the packets, one
can send log2n! bits. For this to be possible, a reference to relate sorted packet numbers to their actual natural
order is needed. This can be found in a 32-bit Sequence number field of the Authentication Header (AH) and
Option Data Length and Option Data fields used in IPSec. In [2] an algorithm for best sequence estimation in
resorting, applicable in real networks which do not guarantee the order of delivered packets, is given. The authors
of [79, 80] use exactly the same reordering technique but for sequence of fragments of a given packet, with obtained
PRBR of log2n!, where n is the number of fragments. Another reordering scheme, robust and resilient to external
reordering effects and with built-in error detection/correction capabilities is given in [31]. By using only a subset
of the permutations, the channel is equipped with error detection and correction capabilities, and is extremely
robust and resilient to external reordering effects. PRBR is higher than 2 bits per packet. Galatenko et al [37]
suggested statistical covert channel through a PROXY server that transfers information by reordering packets so
that destination addresses in a series of subsequent packets are ordered.
IPv4 and IPv6 have mechanisms for discovering Path MTU (PMTU) - the smallest, acceptable MTU along the
entire end-to-end path. They are PMTUD (Path MTU Discovery) for IPv4 and PLPMTUD (Packetization Layer
Path MTU Discovery) for IPv6. The first one use probe messages with DF flag set and ICMP for receiving
notifications. The second one learns about PMTU by starting with packets of the relatively small size and when
they get through, the progressively larger ones are send. Probe messages are validated at the transport layer,
without help of the ICMP. One can utilize the probe messages in PMTUD (already knowing the MTU) to carry
steganogram and invoke sending intentional fake ICMP messages by receiver [79, 80]. Covert probe messages can
be distinguished by use of hash function, and fake ICMP messages can be distinguished by modifying TTL. RBR
can be expressed as
∑i=n
i=1 Pi/T bps, where n denotes number of probes sent from sender to receiver, Pi probe
payload size and T connection duration. The authors also suggest use of RSTEG (Retransmission Steganography)
[81] for steganographic PLPMTUD, which uses intentional retransmissions to sent steganograms.
Abad [1] demonstrated how a fundamental flaw in the design of the Internet checksum can allow a malicious user
to embed covert channel data in the 16-bit Header checksum field itself using a hash collision. To obtain hidden
message, the receiver need to know and include original TTL value before calculating the checksum.
Padlipsky et al [90] suggested a covert timing channel, in which the sender send or not send an IP packet in an
arranged time interval. If a second is divided in N intervals, the RPR of this channel is N bps. Cabuk et al [17]
implemented this idea. Client program listens on a given port for arriving of the first PDU. Additionally, the
server send not only data bits, but also synchronization and error-correcting bits. One advantage of this channel
is that a loss of packet does not affect the synchronization. Big disadvantage is creating of IPDs pattern if same
time interval is used.
Berk et al [11] use the inter-packet delays (IPDs) of consecutive packets for encoding the covert information.
In their system all the delays are stored and an average is calculated every time a new delay comes in. Every
delay above the mean is decoded as binary one, and every delay below the mean is decoded as binary zero. For
ex-filtrating the typed data, it is enough for the attacker to put some device between the keyboard and the victim
computer (Keyboard JitterBug [104]). In some applications (SSH, Telnet, etc) each keypress corresponds to a
packet being sent out on the network, and by introducing small delays in keypresses, a passive covert timing
channel can be created. In JitterBug, to encode a binary 0, the added delay is multiply of the timing window
w, and to encode binary 1, the added delay is multiply of [
w
2
]. Cabuk [18] presents improved timing channel
based on replay attack, which uses saved real IPDs samples divided in two groups. Binary 1 is send by randomly
Figure 1. Gianvecchio et al [40] framework for building model-based covert timing channels with inter-packet delays.
replaying IPD from one group, and binary 0 by randomly replaying IPD from other group.
Timing channels, suggested in [40] and [102] model and mimic the statistical properties of inter-packet delays of
legitimate traffic, and they are computationally non-detectable if IPDs are independent identically distributed
(iid). For example, this holds for real Telnet traffic [91]. Gianvecchio et al [40] offer a framework, with filter,
analyzer, encoder, and transmitter (Figure 1). The filter profiles the real traffic, and the analyzer fits the real
traffic behaviour to a model (Exponential, Pareto, Piosson, etc). Then, based on the model, the encoder chooses
the appropriate distribution functions from statistical tools and traffic generation libraries to create covert timing
channels, and finally, the transmitter generates covert traffic, blending it with real traffic. The channel from [102]
uses intentional IPDs of consecutive packets for encoding L-bit binary strings in a sequence of n packet inter-
transmission times T1, T2, . . . , Tn, and masking the secret message with random numbers obtained by CSPRNG
using one-time pad encryption technique. One disadvantages of the last two channels is that they require accessible
sequence numbers in the legitimate traffic for synchronisation, which is usually available in TCP traffic, but not
always in UDP traffic. Another timing channel with reduced robustness against network jitter as drawback is given
in [127]. This channel has better synchronisation obtained from using keyed hash function instead of CSPRNG
for obtaining random numbers, and is stealthier because it encodes covert bits only into the least significant part
of IPDs.
In [114, 115] a novel covert channel is suggested based on the use of the “traceroute” command and IP header
Record route options, which can have length up to 40B. Trabelsi and Jawhar [116] give a novel covert file transfer
protocol (CFTP) based on the IP Record route option. The proposed protocol is based on a novel session-oriented
mechanism that offers TCP-like features embedded inside the IP option field.
Allix [4] gives the example of the following timing covert channel: let the attacker has the control of two machines
A and B, each one having a connection to the same server C. If the machine A sends a packet and then the
machine B sends two packets, this can be interpreted like a 0. If the machine A send two packets and then the
machine B one, this can be interpreted like a 1. Allix suggests a counting covert channel also, with a chosen
arbitrary number λ. During a connection if the number of transferred data is inferior to λ, this codes a binary
Table 2. Covert timing channels for IP.
Paper Year Method Advantages Disadvantages Defence
Padlipsky et al [90] 1978
Send or not IP
packet in interval
Good
synchronization
Abnormal shape
and regularity
-similarity test [17]
EN and CCE test [41]
Servetto et al [103] 2001 Phantom packets
Need of
synchronization
Ahsan et al [2]
Ahsan [3] 2002 Packet sorting
External
reordering
effects
Galatenko et al [37] 2005
Packet sorting
with ordered
dest. addresses
Different error
rate with
sequence length
External
reordering
effects
Shah et al [104] 2006 IPDs
Similar shape
and regularity
as normal traffic
Needs access to
the link between
keyboard and computer EN test [41]
Cabuk [18] 2006 IPDs
Real saved
IPDs samples Abnormal regularity CCE test [41]
Allix [4] 2007
Sending more
or less data
than λ Easy deployment
Gianvecchio et al [40] 2008 IPDs
Similar shape
and regularity
as normal traffic
Bad
synchronization and
easy detection for
non iid normal IPDs
Auto-correlation
test [127]
CCE test [41]
Sellke et al [102] 2009 IPDs
Non-detectable if
normal IPDs are iid
Bad
synchronization and
easy detection for
non iid normal IPDs
Auto-correlation
test [127]
Mazurczyk et al
[79] 2009
Different rates
for fragments
No need of
synchronization
Reassemble in
intermediate node
[79, 80]
Mazurczyk et al
[79] 2009
Phantom
fragments
No need of
synchronization Modified receiver
Mazurczyk et al
[79] 2009
Fragment
sorting
No need of
synchronization
External
reordering
effects
El-Atawy et al [31] 2009 Packet sorting
Error detection
and correction
Zander et al [127] 2011 IPDs
Better synchronisation
and stealthiness
than [40] and [102]
Reduced robustness
against
network jitter
zero, if the number of transferred data is superior or equal to λ, this codes a binary one.
Graf [43] suggests using of IPv6 Destination Options header for hiding the message which is first TLV encoded.
Lucena et al [66] analysed several covert storage channels in headers of IPv6 and for some of them, the sender
must compute the ICV including the covert data. Manipulation of the IP header can be done in several ways:
 by setting false traffic in the 8-bit Traffic class,
 by setting false flow in the 20-bit Flow Label,
 by setting false source address in the 128-bit Source Address,
 by setting an initial Hop Limit value and manipulating the value of subsequent packets. A drawback of
this channel is that packets do not necessarily travel the same route, so the number of intermediate hops
may vary. By modifying n packets, n− 1 bits are send,
Table 3. Additional covert channels for IPv6.
Paper Year Method Type PRBR Advantages Disadvantages Defence
Graf [43] 2003
Options in
Destination
Options header storage
max field
length Big covert rate Easy elimination
Traffic normalizer
and active warden
Lucena et al [66] 2005 Traffic class storage 8 Big covert rate
Intermediate
node can change
the field
Stateful Active
Warden [66]
Lucena et al [66] 2005 Flow Label storage 20 Big covert rate
Many flow
labels between
two hosts
Stateful Active
Warden [66]
Lucena et al [66] 2005 Source Address storage 128 Big covert rate Easy elimination
Egress
filtering
Lucena et al [66] 2005 Hop limit storage Easy deployment Noise channel
Stateful Active
Warden [66]
Lucena et al [66] 2005 Payload Length storage
up to
(216 − |LegP |)B
Legitimate
packet
Failure in the
ICV calculation
Lucena et al [66] 2005
Option Data Length
and Option Data
in the Hop-by-hop
options header storage
up to
2038B Very high rate
Failure in the
ICV calculation
Stateless Active
Warden [66]
Lucena et al [66] 2005
Reserved in
Routing header storage 4B Big covert rate
Failure in the
ICV calculation
Stateless Active
Warden [66]
Lucena et al [66] 2005
fabricating
addresses in
Routing header storage
up to
2048B Very high rate
Many different
routing headers
between two
nodes
Stateful Active
Warden [66]
Lucena et al [66] 2005
Option Data Length
and Option Data
in the Destination
options header storage
up to
2038B Very high rate
Failure in the
ICV calculation
Lucena et al [66] 2005
False padding
in the Destination
options header storage
up to
256B Very high rate
Failure in the
ICV calculation
Stateful Active
Warden [66]
Lucena et al [66] 2005
Two Reserved
fields in
Fragment header storage 8 + 2 Big covert rate Easy elimination
Stateless Active
Warden [66]
Lucena et al [66] 2005
Next Header
field in
Fragment header storage 8 Big covert rate
Different Next
Header values
among fragments
of same packet
Stateful Active
Warden [66]
Lucena et al [66] 2005 fake fragment storage
up to 64KB/
fragment Very high rate
Failure in the
ICV calculation
Anomalies of single,
unrelated fragments
[79, 80]
Lucena et al [66] 2005
Reserved in
Authentication header storage 2B Big covert rate Easy elimination
Stateless Active
Warden [66]
Lucena et al [66] 2005
Fake
Authentication header storage
up to
1022B Very high rate
Sequence number
values do not
increase
monotonically
Stateful Active
Warden [66]
Lucena et al [66] 2005
Fake
ESP header storage
up to
1022B Very high rate
Sequence number
values do not
increase
monotonically
Stateful Active
Warden [66]
Lucena et al [66] 2005
False padding
value in
ESP header storage
up to
255B Very high rate
Mazurczyk et al
[79, 80] 2009
PLPMTUD
using RSTEG storage
up to
MTU Very high rate
Use of normal
network
retransmission
rate
Comparing
probe messages
[79, 80]
 by setting a valid value to add an extra extension header in the 8-bit Next Header field, or by increasing
value of the Payload Length and append extra data at the end of the packet,
 by modification of the Option Data Length and Option Data fields in the the Hop-by-hop options header.
For false router alert, PRBR is 2B, for false padding value PRBR is up to 256B, and for fabrication of one
or more options, PRBR is up to 2038B,
 by 4-bytes Reserved field or by fabricating addresses up to 2048 bytes per packet in Routing header with
routing Type 0
 by using 8-bit and 2-bit Reserved bits, setting false Next Header or inserting entire false fragment in the
Fragment header. In the last case, authors propose two solutions to avoid this fragment to be included
in the reassembly process: by inserting an invalid value in Identification field in Fragment header that
causes fragment to be dropped, and by inserting overlapping Fragment Offset value that causes data to be
overwritten during reassembly,
 by manipulating Option Data Length and Option Data fields with fabricating one or more options (PRBR
up to 2038B) or setting false padding values (PRBR up to 256B) in the Destination options header,
 by using 2-bytes Reserved field or by creating an entire fake header up to 1022 bytes per packet in the
Authentication header,
 by creating entire fake header up to 1022 bytes per packet or by setting false padding value up to 255 bytes
per packet in the ESP header.
Some of these channels can make failure in the ICV calculation, and trigger immediate detection, so communication
parties need to be careful. Sender need to calculate ICV after inserting covert data, and receiver need to intercept
the packet before it reaches its destination.
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is another connectionless protocol on Internet layer, used to
transfer error messages and other information between the nodes. ICMP messages are send encapsulated in IP
packets. There are 14 (and 16 deprecated) different types of ICMP messages, which have common only first 4 byte
of the 8-byte ICMP header. Project Loki [22, 23] demonstrated a covert channel by putting arbitrary information
tunnelling in the payload of ICMP Echo Request and ICMP Echo Reply packets. Additionally, the Loki client
allows a remote attacker to wrap and transmit commands in ICMP payloads and the Loki server, unwraps and
executes the commands, sending the results back wrapped in ICMP packets. This channel will work for any
network device which does not filter the contents of ICMP Echo traffic, and is very simple to deploy.
Other implementations of IP-over-ICMP tunnels are ICMPTX [113], Skeeve [128], ICMP-Chat [84], etc. Their
PRBR depends on operating system and implementation, and can goes up to 24B, 56B or more. In Skeeve, hidden
sender send an ICMP Echo Request packet to the bounce server with an address of the receiver as a source IP.
Table 4. Covert channels for ICMP.
Paper/tool Year Method Type PRBR Advantages Disadvantages Defence
Loki [22, 23] 1996
Payload of ICMP
Echo Request and
ICMP Echo Reply
packets storage
up to
24B, 56B
or more
IP-over-ICMP
tunnel and
command execution Easy elimination
Blocking and [106]
stateless model
Ahsan [3] 2002
Reserved
field in
ICMP Router
Solicitation Message storage 32 Easy deployment Easy elimination
Traffic normalizer
and active warden
ICMP-Chat [84] 2003
Payload of ICMP
Echo Request and
ICMP Echo Reply
packets storage
up to
24B, 56B
or more
IP-over-ICMP
tunnel,
encryption Easy elimination
Blocking and [106]
stateless model
Skeeve [128] 2004
Payload of ICMP
Echo Request and
ICMP Echo Reply
packets storage
up to
24B, 56B
or more
IP-over-ICMP
tunnel and
command execution Easy elimination
Egress
filtering,
blocking and [106]
stateless model
ICMPTX [113] 2005
Payload of ICMP
Echo Request and
ICMP Echo Reply
packets storage
up to
24B, 56B
or more
IP-over-ICMP
tunnel and
command execution
Easy elimination
and bad
implementation
Blocking and [106]
stateless model
Ping tunnel [110] 2005
Payload of ICMP
Echo Request and
ICMP Echo Reply
packets storage
up to
24B, 56B
or more
TCP-over-ICMP
tunnel,
reliable Easy elimination
Blocking and [106]
stateless model
V00d00n3t [86] 2006
Payload of ICMP
Echo Request and
ICMP Echo Reply
packets storage
IPv6-over-ICMPv6
tunnel and
different options
The bounce server can replay this packet and forward it to the receiver. ICMP-Chat is a simple console-based
chat that uses ICMP packets for communication and AES for data encryption. It offers password protection with
SHA-256 and ability to change usage of ICMP codes within the application. These payload tunnels are further
examined in [111] for resiliency with modern security approaches. Ping tunnel [110] allows to reliably tunnel
TCP connections to a remote host using ICMP Echo Request and Echo Response packets. The tool V00d00n3t
[86] can create covert channels using IPv6 and ICMPv6. It requires 4 digit PIN for sender and receiver, allowing
multiple streams. Ray and Mishra [96] demonstrate that it is possible to transmit large amounts of data covertly
with sophisticated support such as security and reliability, by using ICMP Echo Request packets.
For hiding data in ICMP one can use 32-bit reserved field in ICMP Router Solicitation Message [3].
Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) is a protocol for establishing multicast group memberships
on IPv4 networks. First covert channel for IGMP is suggested in [3]. Scott [101] suggests using of 8-bit and 16-bit
Reserved fields in the IGMPv3 Membership Report, which are usually set to zeroes and ignored by the receiver.
B0CK [120] is one implementation of IGMP/IPv4 covert channel, which uses the Source address field for hiding
data. While B0CK packets have the IP Protocol field set to IGMP, they contain no encapsulated IGMP header;
the packet is padded with 124 bytes of zeros after the 20-byte IP header.
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is another protocol on the Internet layer, that enables a
server to automatically assign an IP address to a computer from a defined range configured for a given network.
Rios et al [97] suggested and implemented the following reliable covert channels in the tool HIDE DHCP:
 by setting the 32-bit XID field, which is randomly generated by the client. This is stealthier, but with
limited bandwidth,
 by using the SECS field, similarly like [42], for transmitting one bit,
 by using the last 10B of the CHADDR field, when 48-bits Ethernet MAC address is used,
 64-byte SNAME and 128-byte FILE fields consist of null-terminated strings, thus hidden data might be
included after this character without negatively impacting other clients or servers. They are set to null by
the operating system when they are not carrying their own data, but in some situations they might contain
information belonging to the Options field, when option 52 (Overload) is included.
 by using variable-length Option Value field, and by the number of options used or the way options are
ordered. The size of the resulting DHCP messages can be suspicious.
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is a protocol for resolution of IP address into a physical address such as
an Ethernet address. Ji et al [53] suggest using of the last 8 bits of the Target protocol address field for carrying
the secret message.
3. Steganography in Transport layer
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) are two protocols that
operates on Transport layer. TCP offers a reliable end-to-end connection-oriented service (see Table 5 for covert
channel), and UDP offers a connectionless oriented service (see Table 6 for covert channel).
Rowland [98] implements Covert TCP by using 32-bit Initial Sequence Number (ISN) and Acknowledge Se-
quence Number fields from TCP header. Rutkowska [99] has created a passive covert channel NUSHU (based on
Covert TCP), which does not generate any additional traffic, but uses data of the existing one. NUSHU sender
modifies the Initial Sequence Number (ISN) and Acknowledge Sequence Number fields generated by OS. Murdoch
and Lewis [85] developed a robust scheme, Lathra, which generates ISNs for OpenBSD and Linux, that are almost
indistinguishable from those generated by a genuine TCP stack, except by wardens with knowledge of a shared
secret key.
Ahsan [3] presented covert storage channels by redundancy present in some combination of six flag bits (URG,
ACK, PSH, RST, SYN, FIN). From 64 possible combinations, 29 are valid. If the URG bit is not set, one can use
the TCP Urgent Pointer field for creating covert channel with 16 bits per packet [3, 45]. One can use Reserved
field for sending 4 bits per segment [4].
Giffin et al [42] presented a covert timing channel that uses TCP timestamps, by the modification of their low
order bit. This method slows the TCP stream so that the timestamps on segments are valid when they are sent.
Table 5. Covert channels for TCP.
Paper/tool Year Method Type
PRBR per
segment Advantages Disadvantages Defence
Covert TCP [98] 1997
ISN and
Acknowledge
Sequence
Number fields storage 64 Easy deployment
Differentiation
from
normal ISNs
SVM [109] and
anomaly
tests [85]
Ahsan [3]
Hintz [45] 2002
Urgent Pointer
field storage 16
Abad [1] 2001 Header checksum storage 16
Deployment in
IP, TCP, UDP
Need to know
original TTL
Giffin et al [42] 2002
TCP
timestamps timing 1
No need of
synchronisation
Some timestamps
are skipped
Ratio of used
different
timestamps and
total number of
timestamps [45]
NUSHU [99] 2004 ISN storage 32 Passive channel
Differentiation
from
normal ISNs
Anomaly
tests [85] and
neural
networks [117]
Lantra [85] 2005 ISN storage 32
Indistinguishable
ISNs
Chakinala et al
[21] 2006
Segment
reordering timing log2n!
Allix [4] 2007 Reserved storage 4 Easy deployment Easy elimination
Traffic normalizer
and active warden
Cloak [69] 2007
N packets
over
X TCP flows timing Reliable
Restricts
the decoder
location
TCP-Script [70] 2008 TCP bursts timing
Robust against
network jitter,
packet loss
and reordering
Differentiable
from normal
traffic
Deviation score
for the burst size,
entropy of burst
size, and inter
ACK-data delay
[70]
CLACK [71] 2009
Acknowledge
Sequence Number storage 32
Reliable and
resilience to
adverse network
conditions
RSTEG [81, 82] 2010 retransmissions storage
max IP
payload length Big covert rate
Use of normal
network
retransmission
rate Passive warden [81]
ACKLeaks [72] 2011 TCP ACK packets storage
Do not modify
any packets
Errors from
ACK losses
1-bit-per-segment covert channel can be obtained by comparing the low order bit of every TCP timestamp with
the current message bit. If they match the segment is sent immediately with generated TCP timestamp, otherwise
it is delayed for one timestamp tick and TCP timestamp is incremented. On slow network this channel is hard
to detect because the low order bit of the timestamp appears randomly distributed.
Chakinala et al [21] extend the reordering scheme proposed in [2, 3] and create a timing covert channel by
reordering of TCP segments and using the Sequence Number field and suitably defined mathematical model.
Luo et al [71] implemented storage covert channel Clack by modification of the Acknowledge Sequence Number
field. Luo et al [72] implemented ACKLeaks covert channel which embeds covert messages into pure TCP ACK
packets from single or multiple TCP connections, using the combinatorial approach. ACKLeaks can evade content-
based detection methods and can be implemented by exploiting the existing TCP connections. Cloak [69] is a
Table 6. Covert channels for UDP.
Paper/tool Year Method Type
PRBR per
segment Advantages Disadvantages Defence
Abad [1] 2001 Header checksum storage 16
Deployment in
IP, TCP, UDP
Need to know
original TTL
Fisk et al [34] 2002
Presence/absence
of Checksum storage 1 Easy deployment Easy detection Active warden [34]
Thyer [112] 2008
Source address,
Length and
Checksum storage
up to
6B Easy deployment Easy elimination
Active warden
and egress
filtering [34]
new class of reliable timing covert channels, which encodes a message by a unique distribution of N packets over
X TCP flows with ten different encoding and decoding methods, and carefully crafted to mimic the normal TCP
flows. Sender can establish HTTP session with a remote server which consists of several TCP flows, or with
multiple servers. The warden could not detect Cloak simply based on the presence of multiple TCP flows to the
same server, because it is not uncommon to have multiple TCP flows in an HTTP session. In the second case,
the decoder should be located on the common routing path. TCP-Script [70] is another implementation of timing
covert channel, which embeds the message in the normal TCP data bursts, and exploits TCP’s feedback and
reliability service to increase the decoding accuracy. The message is represented by an array of positive integers
mi, where mi ∈ [1,M ] and M is a constant pre-agreed by the encoder and decoder. Each mi is encoded by a burst
of mi back-to-back TCP data segments, send in the encoding period TE . Two adjacent data bursts are separated
by an appropriate time interval. This channel is robust against network jitter, packet loss and reordering, but
has very low capacity and it is easy to differentiate its traffic from legitimate traffic.
Mazurczyk et al [81, 82] apply RSTEG method to TCP by using all TCP retransmission mechanisms: RTO
(Retransmission Timeout), FR/R (Fast Retransmit/Recovery) and SACK (Selective ACK). The main idea behind
RSTEG is to not acknowledge a successfully received TCP segment in order to intentionally invoke retransmission.
The retransmitted segment carries a steganogram instead of user data in the payload field. The intentional
retransmissions due to RSTEG should be kept near normal network retransmission rate, to avoid detection.
Authors use hash function for marking covert segments. One limitation is the need of using normal network
retransmission rates for harder detection.
One covert channel in UDP can be created by presence or absence of the Checksum field in the datagram [34],
because this field is optional in UDP. This results in PRBR of 1 bit per datagram. Abad [1] method can be
applied to TCP and UDP Checksum field also. UDP offers 3 fields [112] for carrying secret data up to 6B: Source
address, Length and Checksum.
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) (versions 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0) and its successor Transport Layer Security (TLS)
(versions 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2) are secure communications protocols for encryption/decryption of data in transfer
between two sides. A hybrid covert channel as a combination of simple network covert channel in TCP and
subliminal channel in SSL/TLS is given in [6, 7].
Table 7. Covert channels for HTTP.
Paper/tool Year Method Type PRBR Advantages Disadvantages Defence
Reverse WWW
Shell tool [118] 1999
HTTP
request/response storage varies Easy deployment
Pre-configured
master
Analysing HTTP
traffic [14, 88]
Corkscrew [89] 2001
HTTP
request/response storage varies
SSH over
HTTP tunnel
Suspicious
SSH traffic
Analysing HTTP
traffic [14, 88]
Bowyer [15] 2002
URL parameters
or body of
GET request storage varies
Communication
through
firewalls
Easy detection
if data hide
in GET body
Analysing HTTP
traffic [14, 88]
Dyatlov et al [30] 2003
HTTP
request/response storage varies Very high rate
Easy detection
if data hide
in GET body
Analysing HTTP
traffic [14, 88]
Muted Posthorn [10] 2003 Redirection storage
up to
1024B Very high rate
Analysing HTTP
traffic [14, 88]
Muted Posthorn [10] 2003 Referer storage
up to
1024B Very high rate
Analysing HTTP
traffic [14, 88]
Muted Posthorn [10] 2003 Set-Cookie storage
up to
4096B Very high rate
Analysing HTTP
traffic [14, 88]
Muted Posthorn [10] 2003
HTML elements
and
Active contents storage
Analysing HTTP
traffic [14, 88]
Alman [5] 2003
CONNECT
method storage
Establishing
VPN
Eßer et al [32] 2005
Delaying
or not a
response timing 1
HTTunnel [63] 2005 storage
TCP and UDP
over
HTTP tunnel
Analysing HTTP
traffic [14, 88]
Kwecka [61] 2006
consequent linear
white space
characters
(CLRF, SP, HT]) storage
up to
8190B Very high rate Easy detection
Inline Filtering
Agent [61]
Wondjina [119] 2006
HTTP
Entity tags storage
Wondjina [119] 2006
ContentMD5
header storage 128
Castro [19] 2006 cookies storage
Dunkan et al [29] 2010
Access-Control-
Allow-Origin
and Content-
Location header storage
Dunkan et al [29] 2010
Date and
Last-Modified storage
Date can
be rewritten StegoProxy [13]
4. Steganography in Application layer
Several protocols at the Application layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack can be used for creating covert channels,
like HTTP, FTP, DNS, RTP, RTCP, SIP, SDP, etc.
HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Even most restrictive organizations usually allow the HTTP traffic.
Dyatlov et al [30] suggest covert storage channels using header and/or body of the HTTP request/response. There
is no limits from the protocol itself in the size of the HTTP header or the body. But the size of all HTTP headers
together depends on platform - Apache servers accept headers with size up to 8KB, IIS up to 8KB or 16KB
depending on the version. The Reverse WWW Shell tool [118] demonstrates how effective is HTTP in hidden
messages delivery. In practice, the client slave application contacts the pre-configured master via an outgoing
HTTP Request. The master application send shell commands as HTTP Response packets, and output from
commands return from the slave as cgi script HTTP GETs. Bowyer [15] uses HTTP for secret communication
with Trojans behind firewalls, with the secret messages encoded as URL parameters or after GET request.
Bauer [10] suggests a protocol “Muted Posthorn” that allows to create an anonymous overlay network by exploiting
the web browsing activities of regular users. the protocol uses five HTTP/HTML mechanisms: redirects, cookies,
Referer headers, HTML elements and Active contents.
Kwecka [61] hides data in HTTP using the fact that HTTP treats any amount of consequent linear white space
characters (optional line feed [CLRF], spaces [SP] and tabs [HT]) present in the header, in the same way as a
single space character. For example, [HT] can be a binary one and [SP] can be a binary zero. Headers come in no
specified order, so it is possible to embed data in the ordering of the headers. Header names are case-insensitive,
so using the different capitalisation of the header values can be used for covert channel. Alman [5] showed that
due to a weakness in the CONNECT method in the HTTP protocol, arbitrary connection can be made through
a HTTP proxy server and even a VPN can be established. Van Horenbeeck [119] implemented a tool Wondjina
that creates a tunnel using the HTTP Entity tags (ETag and If-None-Match headers), which allows a client to
verify whether its locally cached copy is still current. Even a Content-MD5 header can be used for transferring up
to 128 bits of data per HTTP message. Similar ideas are used in [29], together with Access-Control-Allow-Origin
and Content-Location header. Another approach involves modulating the least significant bits of the date-based
fields such as Date and Last-Modified.
Eßer and Freiling [32] suggest covert timing channel using HTTP, in which a web server sends covert data to a
client by delaying a response (binary 1) or responding immediately (binary 0). Castro [19] suggest using cookies
for creating covert channels in HTTP.
Padgett [89] developed a tool Corkscrew for tunneling SSH over HTTP proxy, and LeBoutillier [63] implemented
a tool HTTunnel for tunneling TCP or UDP over HTTP.
Infranet [33] is a framework which uses covert channels in HTTP to circumvent censorship. Infranet’s web servers
receive covert requests for censured web pages encoded as a sequence of HTTP requests to harmless web pages
and return their content hidden inside harmless images using steganography.
File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Zou et al [130] suggested two covert channels into the FTP. The first one
encodes covert bits directly into the FTP commands, so if there are N commands, every command will represents
log2N bits. The second one varies the number of FTP NOOP commands send during idle periods. The number
of send NOOP commands is equal to the integer value of the covert data. Before sending a new value, an ABOR
command needs to be sent. For FTP, it is normal to send NOOP or ABOR continually to prevent the control
connections from entering idle status.
Domain Name System (DNS). DNS is very suitable for creating covert channels for tunnelling other protocols,
for example IP, TCP or UDP over DNS. Specially interested are NS, CNAME and TXT records with length up
to 255B, and experimental NULL record with length up to 65536B (300B-1200B in implementations).
Two IPv4-over-DNS tools implemented in C, are Nameserver Transfer Protocol - NSTX [100] and Iodine [60].
Table 8. Covert channels for DNS.
Paper/tool Year Method Type PRBR Advantages Disadvantages Defence
NSTX [100] 2002 TXT records storage
up to
255B
IPv4-
over-DNS
Splits
IP packets
Blocking by
forbidding non-
compliant names
in queries [87]
DNSCat [94] 2004 CNAME records storage
up to
255B
IPv4-
over-DNS
Splits
IP packets
Limit the
DNS bandwidth
OzymanDNS [55] 2004 TXT records storage
up to
255B
TCP or SSH-
over-DNS
and supports
of EDNS0
Must provide
a reliable
communication
Blocking
rarely used
records or
extensions [87]
Anonymous [8] 2005 Negative caching timing 1
No need to
maintain or run
a DNS server
Choosing
good subdomains
DNS2TCP [25] 2008 TXT records storage
up to
255B
TCP or SSH-
over-DNS
Must provide
a reliable
communication
Blocking by
forbidding non-
compliant names
in queries [87]
TUNS [87] 2009 CNAME records storage
up to
255B
IPv4-
over-DNS,
doesn‘t split
IP packets
Slower for
perfect network
Limit the
DNS bandwidth
Iodine [60] 2010
Download -
NULL records (or
TXT, SRV, MX,
CNAME, A records),
upload -
Domain Name storage
Download -
up to 1200B,
upload -
up to 255B
IPv4-
over-DNS
and supports
of EDNS0
Splits
IP packets
Blocking
rarely used
records or
extensions [87]
Both split IP packets into several chunks, send them separately, then reassemble the IP packets at the other
endpoint. For encoding data into queries, NSTX uses a non-compliant Base64 encoding, and replies are carried
with TXT records. Iodine has support for a DNS extension EDNS0, which allows to use DNS packets longer
than the initially chosen 512-byte limit. For download traffic, Iodine uses NULL records (or TXT, SRV, MX,
CNAME, A records), and upload traffic is gzziped and Base32 or non-compliant Base64 encoded in the Domain
Name field from DNS Resource record. DNSCat [94] is a Java IPv4-over-DNS tool which uses CNAME records
for download traffic. TUNS [87] is another IPv4-over-DNS tool (in Ruby), which doesn‘t split IP packets. It uses
only CNAME records with Base32 encoding for sending data, which are frequently used in normal DNS traffic,
so TUNS traffic is harder to filter. TUNS uses caching to resolve the problem with duplicated DNS queries and
experiments showed that for perfect network conditions it is the slowest implementation, but in presence of packet
loss, performs much better.
OzymanDNS [55] and DNS2TCP [25] are two tools for tunnelling TCP or SSH over DNS, which use TXT records.
Their main drawback is that they must provide a reliable communication channel over an unreliable protocol,
and thus deal with losses, retransmissions, reordering and duplication of DNS packets.
Covert timing channel for DNS, which uses DNS negative caching, i.e. caching NXDOMAIN answer for non-
existent domains, is given in [8]. By querying a previously agreed set of subdomains of one non-existent domain,
two hosts can covertly exchange messages, treating each cached subdomain as a binary one, and non-cached
Table 9. Covert channels for RTP and RTCP.
Paper/tool Year Method Type PRBR Advantages Disadvantages Defence
Mazurczyk et al [78] 2008 Padding field storage 8 Easy elimination
Traffic normalizer
and active warden
Mazurczyk et al [78] 2008 Extension header storage varies Big covert rate Easy elimination
Traffic normalizer
and active warden
Mazurczyk et al [78] 2008
Sequence Number
field storage 16 Hard detection
Only for first
RTP packet
Mazurczyk et al [78] 2008
Timestamp
field storage 32 Hard detection
Only for first
RTP packet
Mazurczyk et al [78] 2008
Timestamp
field timing 1
No need of
synchronisation
Some timestamps
are skipped
Ratio of used
different
timestamps and
total number of
timestamps [45]
Mazurczyk et al [78] 2008
NTP Timestamp
in RTCP timing 1
No need of
synchronisation
Some timestamps
are skipped
Ratio of used
different
timestamps and
total number of
timestamps [45]
Mazurczyk et al [78] 2008
Report blocks
in RR and SR
in RTCP storage
up to
160 Big covert rate
Mazurczyk et al [78] 2008
authentication
tag storage 80 Hard detection
Stripping
this field [78]
LACK [78] 2008
intentionally
delayed packets timing
Receiver
discard
packets
Do not exceed
accepted level
of packet loss Active warden [78]
Bai et al [9] 2008
interarrival
jitter in
RTCP storage 32
Use of jitter
statistics
Lizhi et al [64] 2012
Send RTP or
(RTP, RTCP)
packet storage 32
Robust with
many 0s
domain as binary zero. There is no need hosts to maintain or run a DNS server, and no need to know each other
addresses.
Another interesting area for deployment of covert channels are real-time applications over IP, as for example
Voice over IP (VoIP), on-line multi-player games, streaming live A/V, etc. In these applications, usually audio
and/or video is transmitted using separated streams by Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP), supported by its
companion RTP Control Protocol (RTCP). One part of the RTP works in the Transport layer above UDP, and
second in the Application layer. On the other hand, VoIP has signalling phase at the beginning (before audio
transfer using RTP), which is carrying by some signalling protocol, like Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). SIP
usually is accompanied by some protocol for description of multimedia sessions, like Session Description Protocol
(SDP).
Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP). Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski
[78] explained how to create covert channels in RTP, using 8-bits Padding field, variable-length Extension header,
randomly generated initial values of the 16-bit Sequence Number and 32-bit Timestamp fields in the first RTP
packet, or applying here Giffin et al [42] method with low order bit of Timestamp for creating one-bit-per-RTP
packet covert channel (Table 9). The last method can be used also in NTP Timestamp field in RTCP, but even
more, up to 160 bits per packet covert channel can be obtain from report blocks in Receiver Report (RR) and
Sender Report (SR) in RTCP. One can use also security mechanisms‘ fields in Secure RTP or in RTCP, like up
to 80-bit authentication tag. In the same paper, authors suggest one method called LACK (Lost Audio Packets
Steganographic Method) for creating covert channel, using intentionally delayed (and in consequence lost) packets
payloads. The payload of the intentionally delayed packets is used to transmit secret information to receivers
aware of the procedure. If the delay of such packets at the receiver is considered excessive, the packets are
discarded by a receiver. Additionally, communication parties must consider the accepted level of packet loss for
IP telephony and do not exceed it. First practical evaluation of this method is given in [83]. Other RTP payload
based covert channels are not of our interests.
Bai et al [9] used the 32-bit interarrival jitter field of the RTCP header for creating a covert channel. They used
two phases: in the first phase, statistics of the value of the jitter field in the current network are calculated. In
the second phase, the secret message is modulated into the interarrival jitter field according to the previously
calculated parameters. Lizhi et al [64] suggest novel covert timing channel, which utilizes Run Length Code and
Multi-Zero Code (to avoid frequently sending RTCP packets) to improve imperceptibility and robustness. The
basic idea is very simple, if the current stegobit is the same as previous, an RTP packet is sent, otherwise an
RTCP packet and an RTP packet are both sent.
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP). Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski
[77] suggest to use some tokens and fields in SIP for hiding data, like randomly generated tag in From field
(which forms SIP dialog identifier), branch in Via field (which forms transaction identifier), Call-ID field (which
uniquely identifies a call), first part of CSeq field (initial sequence number that serves as a way to identify and
order transactions), Max-Forwards fields and several other fields. They also suggest to hide data in SDP in the
fields v (version field ignored by SIP), o (owner/creator), s (session name - field ignored by SIP), t (time session
is active - field ignored by SIP), and k (potential encryption key if the secure communication is used). Another
covert channel exploits the fact that the order of headers in the SIP/SDP message depends on implementation,
thus reordering of headers is possible as a mean to covertly send data. For example, Call-ID field after CSeq field
is binary 1, and opposite is binary 0. Fields are not case sensitive, so one can create channel by using upcase for
binary 1 and lowercase for binary 0.
The authors of [77] suggest also creating of covert channels in SIP and SDP using security mechanisms for
providing authentication and confidentiality. SDP content embedded into the SIP INVITE message, may be
encrypted and signed using S/MIME, and the secured parts of the message are divided from themselves using
boundary randomly generated value, so this is first possible covert channel. Second possibility is to use the
signature bits inside the boundary values (application/pkcs7-signature) to transfer covert data.
Secure Shell (SSH) is a cryptographic client-server protocol for secure data exchange, remote command ex-
ecution, and other secure network services between two computers that connects, via a secure channel over an
insecure network. Lucena et al [67] suggest the MAC field for carrying messages up to 160 bits per SSH PDU.
Table 10. Covert channels for SSH.
Paper/tool Year Method Type PRBR Advantages Disadvantages Defence
Lucena et al [67] 2004 MAC field storage
up to
160
Randomness
simulation Non reliable
Wrong recomputed
MAC value
Lucena et al [67] 2004
Beginning
of payload storage
up to
20B Big covert rate
Different packet
length
distribution
Packets length
analysis
Perkins [67] 2005
Random padding
field storage
up to
255B Very high rate
Not so
random values Statistical tests
To simulate the randomness of the MAC, the embedded messages are previously compressed and then encrypted
(Table 10). Another way is intermediate nodes to intercept the SSH traffic and inserts an additional encrypted
message (up to 20B) at the beginning of the already encrypted payload. A 4 byte “magic” number at the begin-
ning marks the presence of a hidden message. Hidden message can be carried in the Random padding field [93]
also, with length up to 255B.
5. Defence Mechanisms
Covert channels need first to be identified or detected, before trying to defeat them. Identification tries to
uncover a shared resource in the design phase, that can potentially be used as a covert channel variable, while
detection tries to detect an actively running covert channel by examining its output events. There are several
formal methods for identifying network covert channels: applying Shared Resource Matrix (SRM) method [56]
in [27, 57], Covert Flow Tree (CFT) method [58], etc. Once identified or detected, the covert channel can be
eliminated, limited, audited and/or documented [126].
Detecting covert timing channels is a challenging task and is usually based on some statistical tests for differenti-
ating the covert from legitimate traffic. There are two basic classes of detection tests: shape test and regularity
test. The first class uses first-order statistics (mean, variance, distribution), while the second class uses second or
higher-order statistics. The regularity test is based on the fact that the variance of the legitimate IPDs changes
over time, whereas for some timing channels the variance of the IPDs remains relatively constant.
Peng et al [92] uses Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for detection of watermarked IPDs in [121, 122]. Cabuk et al [17]
suggest the use of -similarity test for detecting [17, 90] timing channel, which has a feature of creating clusters of
similar IPDs at multiples of some time intervals. This and some other existing detection methods [11, 38] targets
only specific timing channels, or can not perform well for high variation of network traffic. The authors of [127]
using auto-correlation test showed that [40, 102] timing channels are easy to detect with 80% accuracy and a
false positive rate of 0.5%, when IPDs of legitimate traffic are not iid. Detection accuracy of the same test for
[127] channel is reduced down to 9%.
The most promising method for detecting covert timing channels based on IPDs is given in [39, 41] and is based
on the observation that covert timing channels have effects on the entropy of the original process. The first
order entropy (EN) is useful for comparing the shape of distributions of random variables, and the entropy rate
estimated by minimum corrected conditional entropy (CCE) is useful for comparing the regularity of time series.
Experiments showed that several timing channels can be detected, like: [90] channel (with abnormal shape and
regularity), [17] (with similar shape and abnormal regularity), [40] (with similar shape and regularity as normal
traffic) and [104] (with similar shape and regularity as normal traffic).
Timestamp channels [42] and [97] with SECS field, can be detected by computing the ratio of the number of used
different timestamps and total number of possible timestamps. For legitimate connection this ratio is close to 1,
and for covert channel is around 0.5 [45], because many timestamps are skipped.
Detection of fragmentation methods given in [79, 80] can be performed by different statistical test based on
number of fragments, fragment size, presence of unrelated fragments, and fragment rates. The best method
[79, 80] for their elimination is to reassembly original IP packet in the intermediate node responsible for detecting
steganographic communication, then refragment it randomly and send to the receiver.
Most of the covert storage channels can be eliminated effectively through protocol scrubbers [73], traffic normaliz-
ers [47] and active wardens [34]. Protocol scrubbers and traffic normalizers are focused on eliminating ambiguities
found in the traffic stream created by an attacker. Active wardens and traffic normalizers modify incoming and
outgoing packets by setting unused, and reserved fields to zero, setting paddings to zero and removing extensions.
They can be part of end host or network devices. Using traffic normalization, header fields that are used some-
times, also can be set to zero or rewritten under some conditions. For example, TTL channels [95, 125] can be
eliminated by active warden which sets TTLs of all packets of a flow to the same value [125].
Lucena et al [66] suggest three types of active warden: stateless, stateful, and network-aware, for IPv6 channels.
Stateless active warden has no recollection of previous packets nor previously encountered semantic conditions.
Stateful active warden can also registers already-observed semantic conditions, and applies that knowledge in
subsequent monitoring sessions. Network-aware active warden additionally has knowledge of the topology of the
surrounding networks.
Several covert channels can be eliminate by blocking protocols/ports by firewalls (Loki [22, 23], ICMPTX [113],
Skeeve [128], ICMP-Chat [84]) or ingress/egress filtering (B0CK [120], Skeeve [128], false IPv6 Source Address
[66]). Another defence mechanisms against ICMP tunnelling are partially disabling ICMP traffic, limiting the
size of ICMP packets, preserving ICMP packet for later investigation, and Singh et al [106] stateless model, which
zeros out the entire payload of the ICMP packet.
Covert−TCP [98] can be detected using a Support Vector Machine (SVM) [109], and together with NUSHU [99]
by [85] anomaly tests, because covert headers are easily distinguished from those generated by a genuine TCP/IP
stack.
To fight RSTEG [81], a passive warden with large memory can be used which monitor TCP traffic and store
segments. On retransmissions, passive warden compares originally sent segment with retransmitted one and if
the payload differs RSTEG is detected and the segment is dropped.
To counter both UDP covert channels [34, 112] anomaly detection and/or egress filtering is needed [34].
By using behaviour profiles of traffic flows Pack et al [88] suggest the method for detecting HTTP tunnels. Their
method contains the local level analysis module, which searches for local features of individual session packets;
the session level analysis module, which examines the average activities for an entire session up to the current
time; and the verification module, which extracts and considers the contents of packets to verify the existence
of HTTP tunnel. Borders et al [14] tool Web Tap detects HTTP tunnels, by analysis of HTTP traffic over a
training period, design of filters to help detect anomalies in outbound HTTP traffic, and using metrics such as
request regularity, bandwidth usage, inter request delay time, and transaction size. Kwecka [? ] implemented
Inline Filtering Agent which detects its channel and channels created by modification of HTTP header names
and order. [13] proposed a framework for sanitizing incoming and outgoing HTTP connections for tunnels, with
a tool StegoProxy, which can be used for eliminating [29] channel also.
Tunnels over DNS can be detected and/or eliminated by different techniques [87]. NSTX [100] and DNS2TCP
[25] can be blocked by forbidding non-compliant names in queries. They, together with Iodine and OzymanDNS
and be blocked by not serving queries for rarely used DNS records (TXT, NULL) or extensions (EDNS0). If
filtering of CNAME records is not applicable, one can limit DNS covert channel by limiting the DNS bandwidth
to several requests per second.
SSH [67] MAC channel can be detected by wrong recomputed MAC value at the receiver end, and other [67]
channel can be detected if sender do not care about packet length distribution in the normal SSH traffic.
Several solutions are suggested for limiting the capacity of the covert channels, like: introduction of random
noise for covert channel masking, insertion of dummy packets, delaying packets, use of fixed packet rates [52],
introduction of noise to all clocks [123], etc.
6. Conclusions
Recent research directions are towards designing of novel covert channels in Internet services, like IP telephony,
P2P services (Skype and BitTorrent), social networks (Facebook), new network protocols, cloud computing envi-
ronment, etc, and their detection, and possible elimination or limitation.
Because covert channels usually have malicious application and represent a serious network threat, this field is
very important to network security. Many network covert channels are identified and detected. This is continuous
race between hackers and security experts. Surveys of this type are necessary for following trends in this field.
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